Seventh Circuit Holds Withstanding Dismissal in a Parallel RLUIPA Case in a Totally different Jurisdiction did Not Represent an Extraordinary Circumstance that

This submit was authored by Matthew Loescher, Esq.

In 2020, Phrase Seed sought to buy property for worship companies in Homewood, however the village’s zoning ordinance required Phrase Seed to acquire a particular use allow. Phrase Seed sued Homewood alleging that the particular use allow requirement violated RLUIPA’s provisions on equal phrases, unreasonable limitations, and substantial burdens, and the Fourteenth Modification’s Equal Safety Clause. The district court docket discovered that Phrase Seed didn’t endure an damage as a result of it didn’t apply for a particular use allow, and dismissed the swimsuit for lack of standing.

On attraction, Phrase Seed argued that whereas they didn’t argue future damage earlier than judgment was entered on this case, the truth that they withstood dismissal in a parallel litigation—a swimsuit involving a special village and pending earlier than a special district choose in the identical federal district—was a rare circumstance that warranted reduction. The court docket rejected this place, noting that it’s well-settled {that a} movement to rethink isn’t the right car to lift new arguments that might and will have been raised previous to judgment. Right here, Phrase Seed makes an attempt to beat this well-settled precept by arguing that their profitable litigation in a parallel swimsuit constituted “a big change within the legislation.” The court docket held {that a} choice by one other district choose was not controlling precedent, and subsequently couldn’t represent a big change within the legislation. As Phrase Seed failed to indicate any extraordinary circumstances on this case, the district court docket’s choice to disclaim Phrase Seed’s Rule 60(b) movement was upheld.

Phrase Seed Church v Village of Homewood, 2022 WL 3095971 (seventh Cir. CA 8/4/2022)